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Exculpato

Agreements-A Dilemma For The Courts
& A Problem For Society

Each of us signs away our rights countless times every year. And anyone who
thinks they have been cautious enough as to keep their rights, is more than likely mistaken.
Anyone who has been to a golf course, a baseball game, a football game, a basketball
game, a gym, or an amusement park has more than likely waived his or her rights to
\

recover daniages as a result of injury. After one knowingly contracts away his or her
rights, a question generally arises--Is the exculpation agreement) valid? Unfortunately,
there is no clear answer to this question, as the border between admissible and
inadmissible exculpatory clauses is ever shifting.
Since there is no clear formula courts follow in determining whether an
-exculpatory clause is admissible or inadmissible, exculpatory agreements have caused both
a dilemma for the courts and a problem for society. Although courts have no clear
formula they apply to determine whether or not an exculpatory contract will be upheld; a
trJ
trJ
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careful examination of the types of exculpatory contracts that courts have traditionally
held to be valid, as well as types of exculpatory contracts that courts have traditionally
held to be invalid, will lead to a better understanding of when a court will uphold or refuse
to uphold an exculpatory contract.

- IAn exculpation agreement is an agreement by which a party contracts away liabilty as a
result of their negligence.
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EXCULPATORY AGREEMENTS UPHELD BY COURTS
The basis on which any exculpatory agreem~nt: m,;. be jheld is the basic right of
the parties to contract. One llIinois case, Harris y

(",J~~~s' forth the basis of the

freedom to contract: "We start from our often-repeated axiom that '[p]ublic policy
strongly favors freedom to contract, as is manifest in both the United States Constitution
and our constitution.",2 Illinois precedent holds that courts should not interfere with the
right of two parties to contract: "The rationale for this rule is that courts should not
interfere with the right of two parties to contract with one another if they freely and
knowingly enter into the agreement. ,,3 Thus, the general principle behind a valid
exculpatory contract is the freedom of parties to contract in a manner that will provide the
parties with the opportunity to meet their needs 4 However, the right to contract alone is
not enough to ensure that an exculpatory agreement will be enforced.
Most courts have held that in order for an exculpatory agreement to be upheld, the
agreement must clearly express the intent that one of the parties to the agreement
knowingly agreed to release the other party of his or her negligence 5 It should be noted
that courts decide whether or not the releasor knowingly intended to release the maker of
the exculpatory agreement by looking at all of the relevant circumstances surrounding the
complaint; and the courts decide what the relevant circumstances are case by case.
Therefore, a party to an action involving an exculpatory agreement cannot take for

2HarriSY Walker, 119 III. 2d 542, 544, 519 N.E.2d 917, 919(1lI. Sup. Ct. 1988),
(quoting McClure Engineering Associates, Inc y Reuben H Donnelley Corp, 95 III. 2d
68,72,447 N.E.2d 400 (1lI. Sup. Ct. 1983)).
3Garrison y Combined Fitness Centre, 201 Ill. App. 3d 581, 584, 559 N.E.2d 187, 190
(I st Dist. 1990).
~ote, 1he Quality ofMercy: Charitable Torts and their Continuing Immunity, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1382, 1394 (1987).
. . 5Cadek y Great Lakes Dragaway, Inc, No. 93-C-1402, 843 F. Supp. 420, 422, 1994
U.S. App. LEXIS 1163, at *6 (Northern District of Ill. Feb. 4, 1994).
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granted that a court will hold the circumstances in the case at bar relevant, even if the
circumstances resemble those of a previous case which the court held to be relevant.
Typically, once an exculpatory clause has been worded with sufficient clarity,
courts will not be concerned with a contracting party's awareness of the existence of the
exculpatory clause. The only concern of the court will be whether the clause could have
been reviewed by the releasor with no unusual difficulty6 This means that a party cannot
exert as a defense that he or she did not read the exculpatory agreement before signing the
agreement. Even if the releasor did not read the exculpatory contract, the court will only
consider if the releasor would have been able to ascertain that the agreement indemnified
the releasee had the releasor read the exculpatory contract.
In addition, courts frequently uphold exculpatory clauses when the injury is one
expressly covered by unmistakable language in the exculpatory clause. A Georgia
Appellate court upheld an exculpatory clause in Hall v Gardens Servs , Inc, 332 S.E. 2d
3, 5 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) where a bailor relieved himself ofliability from his own ordinary
negligence, except when the negligence amounted to willful and wanton misconduct 7
The language of the before mentioned case is important in determining whether or not an
exculpatory clause will be upheld by a court. The court in upholding Hall noted that the
exculpatory contract expressly relieved the bailor from his own negligence. Exculpatory
clauses that contain language expressly releasing the releasee of his or her own negligence
effectively preclude the releasor from asserting that he or she was unaware that the
contract released the maker of the contract of his or her own negligence.
The language of Hall is also important in determining when a court will uphold an
exculpatory agreement because the bailor noted that the exculpatory clause would not be

6James Brook, Contractual Disclaimer and Limitation ofLiability Under The Law of
New York, 49 BROOK. L. REV. 1,28 (1982).
7Krystyna M. Carmel, The Equine Activity Liability Acts: A·Discussion of Those in
Existence and Suggestions for a Model Act, 83 KY. LJ. 157, 169 (1994).
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upheld if the injury resulted from negligence as a result of willful and wanton misconduct.
The language contained in Hall that barred the bailor's relief from liability when the injury
resulted from willful and wanton misconduct should be contained in all exculpatory
clauses, as a court will not uphold an exculpatory contract that relieves a party of willful
and wanton misconduct.
Although it is highly recommended that an exculpatory clause expressly contain
the phrase "own ordinary negligence" in order to adequately release the defendant of his
or her liability, it is not always necessary for the exculpatory clause to contain said phrase,
or even to contain the term "negligence:" "Although exculpatory contracts or clauses are
subject to the general rule that they are to be construed most strongly against their maker,
a specific reference to the maker's "negligence" or its cognates is not required. ,,8
However, it is important to note that it is very helpful when the exculpatory agreement
expressly states that the party is releasing others from negligence 9 When the term
"negligence" is not used, it is important that the exculpatory clause clearly establish the
parties' intent preclude such liability. to
Courts often refer to words that describe negligence without expressly containing
the term as "magic words," and many courts are divided on whether an exculpatory clause
is valid only when the term "negligence is included," or if the clause is valid when "magic
words" are included. Given the division of courts on whether or not exculpatory clauses
should contain the term "negligence" or if "magic words" will be sufficient to describe
negligence, it is better to include "negligence" in the exculpatory clause than to risk not
having the clause upheld. II

8Larsen V Vic Tanny Intern, 130 III. App. 3d 574, 576,474 N.E.2d 729, 731 (5th Dist.
1984).
9Joseph H. King, Jr., Exculpatory Agreementsfor Volunteers in Youth Activities - The
Alternative to Nerj(registered) Tiddlywinks, 53 OIDO ST. LJ. 683,712 (1992).
. - 1<1<razek V Mountain Rivers Tours, Inc, 884 F.2d 163, 166 (4th CiT. 1989).
1100nald P. Judges, OfRocks and Hard Places: The Value ofRisk Choice, 42 EMORY
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Courts have consistently upheld that exculpatory clauses are effective in protecting
one from liability of ordinary negligence, yet it is still important for the exculpatory
agreement limiting the liability to contain clear language in describing the scope of
activities that the exculpatory contract protects: "More specifically, such exculpatory
agreements have been upheld in the context of parachuting activities where the language
of the agreement sets forth in clear language the range of activities to which it applies." 12
In Falkner v Hinckley Parachute Center, the Second District court of Illinois held that the
exculpatory clause existing between Falkner and the Hinckley Parachute Center effectively
precluded the administrator of Falkner's estate from bringing a wrongful death action
against the parachute center. Falkner, a student of the Hinckley Parachute Center, fell to
his death when the parachute provided for him by the parachute center became entangled
and failed to slow his fall. 13 The court held in Falkner, that the accident which caused
Falkner's death was well within the range of covered activities in the exculpatory contract:
"We conclude that an accident of the type suffered by the decedent was within the scope
of the exculpatory clause of the training agreement." 14 The exculpatory clause in Falkner
clearly indemnified Hinckley Parachute Center from,
any and all liability claims, demands or actions or causes of action whatsoever
arising out of any damage, loss or injury to the Student or the Student's property
while upon the premises or aircraft of the Hinckley Parachute Center, Inc. or
while participating in any of the activities contemplated by the agreement, whether
such loss, damage, or injury results from negligence of Hinckley Parachute Center,
Inc. * * * or some other cause. (Emphasis added.)15

L.J. I, 115 (1993).
12Falkner v Hinckley Parachute Center,
(2nd Dist. 1989).
13Falkner v Hinckley Parachute Center,
14Falkner v Hinckley Parachute Center,
15Falkner v Hinckley Parachute Center,

178 III. App. 3d 597, 560, 533 N.E.2d 941, 944
178 III. App. 3d at 599, 533 N.E.2d at 943.
178 III. App. 3d at 561, 533 N.E.2d at 945.
178 III. App. 3d at 601, 533 N.E.2d at 945.
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The court further held in Falkner that the parties to an exculpatory contract need
not anticipate the precise action which causes injury, when the exculpatory clause, as the
exculpatory clause in Falkner, contains broad language describing the covered activities. 16
The court explained that the broad language of the release allowed Falkner to contemplate
a wide range of risks that one could expect when jumping out of an airplane, including the
risks of, "unsafe equipment, negligent instruction, and death." 17 As Falkner illustrates, the
maker of an exculpatory agreement should be sure that the exculpatory agreement
contains a range of protected activities from which the release from liability applies.
In addition to the before mentioned exculpatory contracts which courts
tend to uphold, courts are also likely to uphold exculpatory clauses relating to non
essential activities and services, especially when the injured party is able to foresee the risk
which caused the injury. Examples of non-essential activities and services include
activities and services for entertainment. Non-essential activities include baseball, football,
golf, tennis, swimming, and skydiving. Examples of non-essential services include the
services of sport stadiums, amusement parks, exercise gyms, and country clubs. Courts
are likely to uphold exculpatory clauses relating to non-essential activities and services
especially when the injured party is able to foresee the risk which caused the injury. In
order for the maker of an exculpatory contract to ensure that a court will be able to
enforce the contract, the maker should make certain that the releasor is able to foresee a
wide range of injuries from the context of the exculpatory contract.

EXCULPATORY CLAUSES THAT COURTS REFUSE TO UPHOLD
The courts are concerned with fairness when a party claims exemption from
negligence because the parties have entered into an exculpatory clause. The courts will

-6

been violated. Courts have noted that exculpatory clauses are not favored an will be
strictly construed against the contracts maker: "More recently, we observed that
exculpatory clauses are not favored and must be strictly construed against the benefiting
party, particularly one who drafted the release." 18 The standards that a court applies to an
exculpatory agreement in deciding whether or not to uphold the agreement include the
standards of: public policy, unfair bargaining power, and lack of intent of a releasor to

~ releasor of his or her liability.

Courts will frequently refuse to uphold exculpatory

clauses in violation of any of the before mentioned standards.
Courts strictly refuse to uphold any exculpatory contract in violation of public
policy: "A contract which shifts the risks of one's own negligence to another contracting
party will be enforced unless it would be against settled public policy to do so or there is .
something in the social relationship of the parties militating against upholding the
agreement. ,,19 And although courts refuse to uphold any exculpatory agreement in
violation of public policy, there is no one formula courts apply to determine when an
exculpatory contract is in violation of public policy. Courts have labeled certain types of
exculpatory clauses as violating public policy. One such type of an exculpatory clause that
courts have held violative of public policy, is one that most of us are familiar with. The
exculpatory agreement that I am referring to is the type which must be signed as a
condition for participation in interscholastic athletic activities. In Washington, the Odessa
and Seattle school districts required both the students and their parents to sign
"standardized forms" releasing the school districts from any liability as a result of
negligence arising out of the districts' athletic programs. Some of the parents
unsuccessfully tried to strike the exculpatory clause from the agreement, and as a result

18Hams y Walker, 119 Ill. 2d 542, 544, 519 N.E.2d 917, 919 (III. Sup. Ct. 1988).
19Nikolic y Seidenberg, 242 Ill. app. 3d 96, 98-99, 610 N.E.2d 177, 179-80 (2nd Dist.
1993).
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their children were not allowed to participate in the interscholastic athletic activities. 20
This case was heard before the Washington Supreme Court. The Washington Supreme
Court considered whether exculpatory clauses should be allowed as a condition for
participation in interscholastic athletic activities, which was an issue of first impression in
the state ofWasbington. The court held that exculpation clauses required as a condition
for participation in interscholastic athletic activities "violated public policy and were
therefore invalid. ,,21
In addition to refusing to uphold an exculpatory clause violative of public policy,
courts will also refuse to uphold an exculpatory clause in which one party has a superior
bargaining power over the other party. For example, if a releasor is forced to sign an
exculpatory agreement as a condition for receiving medical treatment, then the releasee
has unfair bargaining power. The releasee holds an unfair bargaining power because the
releasor must sign the exculpatory agreement in order to receive the medical treatment.
Exculpatory agreements that must be signed as a condition for medical services will not be
upheld for the reason of unfair bargaining power.
Case law has further established that courts will not uphold exculpatory contracts
when the general language of the contract does not accurately reflect the releasor's intent
to absolve the releasee of his or her liability: "General language is not sufficient to
indicate an intention to absolve a party from liability for negligence. ,,22 In Calarco v
YMCA of Greater Metropolitan, the Second District court of Illinois held that if the
language ofan exculpatory contract does not clearly show the intent of the releasor, then
no inference shall be made from the contract to show an intent to release: "Other

20Case Comment, Negligence-Exculpatory Clallses-School Districts Cannot contract Ollt
ofNegligence Liability in Interscholastic Athletics-Wagenblast v. Odessa School District,
I/O Wash. 2d 845, 758 P.2d 9681988), 102 HARV. L. REV. 729,730 (1989).
21id. at 730
- 22Calaraco V YMCA of Greater Metropolitan, 149 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 1042, SOl N.E.2d
268, 273 (2nd Dist. 1986).
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decisions have stated that a limit on liability for negligence will not be inferred unless such
intention is clearly expressed and that the language of an agreement must clearly notifY the
prospective releasor of the effect of signing the agreement. ..23
In addition to courts holding general language insufficient to indicate intent, the
courts also hold general language insufficient to indicate the covered activities of the
exculpatory contract. For example, in Calarco v YMCA of Greater Metropolitan, the
Second District court of Illinois refused to uphold the exculpatory contract in question as
the language contained on the membership form was not explicit enough to relieve YMCA
from liability for negligence resulting from the use of exercise equipment:
The form does not contain a clear and adequate description of covered
activities. Such as 'use of the said gymnasium or the facilities and equipment
therof,' to clearly indicate that injuries resulting from negligence in maintaining the
facilities or equipment would be covered by the release 24
Exculpatory contracts releasing a party from claims arising from willful conduct or
gross negligence are completely void and will not be enforced. 25 Most courts hold that
exculpatory agreements cannot preclude a plaintiff's claims against a defendant for
intentional torts, or for the more serious forms of negligence often resulting from willful,
wanton, or reckless conduct:
Generally, a release does not bar plaintiff's maintenance of an action
alleging willful and wanton misconduct by the defendants. This rule is based on
the determination that, as a matter of public policy, a plaintiff cannot exculpate or
indemnifY a defendant for the defendant's willful or wanton acts 26

23Calaraco V YMCA of Greater Metropolitan, 149 III. App. 3d at 1042,501 N.E.2d at
273.
24Calaraco v YMCA of Greater Metropolitan, 149 III. App. 3d at 1041,501 N.E.2d at
272.
25James Brook, Contrachlal Disclaimer and Limitation ofLiability Under the Law of
New York, 49 BROOK L. REV. 1,26 (1982).
26Downingv Ilnited Auto Racing Ass'n, 211 III. App. 3d 877, 885,570 N.E.2d 828, 836
(1st Dist. 1991).
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One example of a court allowing a cause of action in a willful and wanton
negligence case is where a court allowed a plaintiff's estate to bring a claim against a
defendant, for the defendant's reckless conduct, where the parties had previously entered
into an exculpatory agreement. The defendant was a railroad company, and the plaintiff
worked for a quarry which had an exculpatory agreement indemnifying the railroad
company for liability to the quarry's employees as a result of the railroad company's own
negligence. The quarry employee was killed at the site when a speeding train struck a
wheelbarrow which was on the train track. As a result of the train striking the
wheelbarrow, the wheelbarrow struck the employee with "enough force to cause fatal
injuries."27 The appellate court held that train's striking of the wheelbarrow on the track
to be willful and wanton negligence, as the train was speeding at the work site. The
appellate court held that the exculpatory clause did not protect the railroad company from
liability as a result of willful and wanton negligence, and remanded the case for a new trial.

'l! ';

Courts are also likely to refuse to uphold exculpatory clauses relating to activities

,,~V~ services necessary to maintain a minimum standard of life, Courts generally will not

~~'(;l<;
" ...~V

uphold exculpatory contracts relating to essential services.

~ssential services include

JJ housing services, medical services and utility services. Courts are concerned with fairness

~jt1~~hen a public service corporation claims an exemption from negligence liability as a part
.(.~:;;.I ~\ ~of their contract or schedule. This is because although the relationship between the public
,~

\y'

'l!Y

:t

service supplier and the customer is contractual; the customer is forced to enter into the
exculpatory contract in order to receive the services. Customers are forced to enter into
exculpatory contracts with utility providers as there is usually only one provider of each

j;/

public utility service in a given area. One such example of a court refusing to uphold an
exculpatory agreement where the customer was forced to sign an exculpatory contract in

27Karen M. Espaldon, Virginia's Rule ofNon-Waiver ofLiabilityfor Negligent Acts:
, ,Hiett V. Lake Barcroft Community Association, Inc., 2 GEO. MASON.V. L. REV. 27, 37
(1994).
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(N. Y.c. Civ. Ct.). In Con Ed the court refused to uphold an exculpatory agreement that
provided "in case the supply of service shall be intenupted or irregular or defective or fail
from causes beyond its control or through ordinary negligence of employees, servants, or
agents the Company will not be liable therefor. ,,28 The court refused to uphold the
exculpatory agreement in the before mentioned case as the customer was forced to sign
the exculpatory agreement as a condition to receive an essential service.

CONCLUSION
Traditionally exculpatory agreements that have been upheld by courts expressly
relieve the defendant of his or her "own ordinary negligence" by the use oflanguage
clearly showing the releasor's intent to release the releasee of his or her liability. Courts
have traditionally refused to uphold exculpatory agreements: where the agreement violates
of public policy; where one party of the exculpatory contract holds an unfair bargaining
power; where the agreement does not contain language clearly establishing the intent of
the releasor to relieve the releasee of his or her "own ordinary negligence;" and where the
injury is a result of willful or wanton misconduct or negligence. There is no one formula
that courts use to apply to exculpatory agreements to decide whether they should be
upheld or held to be invalid; and as a result, exculpatory contracts pose a dilemma for our
courts and a problem for society. Exculpatory clauses pose a dilemma for the courts and a
problem for society, as it is never clear under what circumstances a court will uphold or
refuse to uphold an exculpatory contract.

28James Brook, Contractual Disclaimer and Limitation ofLiability Under the Law of
New York, 49 BROOK L. REV. 1,20-21 (1982).
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